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I. INTRODUCTION
The America Invents Act1 ("AIA") authorizes the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") to undertake a "supplemental
examination" of an issued patent to "consider, reconsider, or correct
information believed to be relevant to the patent." 2 It further bars the
federal courts from holding a patent unenforceable "on the basis of
conduct relating to information" considered during supplemental
examination.3

* Angela S. Cooney Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. I acknowledge, with
appreciation, the research support provided by the Syracuse University College of Law. I can be
reached at ladolak@law.syr.edu.
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 & 28 U.S.C.).
2. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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One obvious purpose underlying supplemental examination is to
constrain the federal courts' power to entertain inequitable conductbased challenges. Many such challenges are unsuccessful, if not
unfounded.4 Supplemental examination will afford patent owners the
opportunity to dispense with anticipated inequitable conduct charges,' in
some cases by demonstrating the immateriality of the information at
issue.6 However, supplemental examination will obviate inequitable
conduct challenges even if patent applicants have withheld or
misrepresented material information with the intent to deceive the
USPTO.7
In this respect and in others, the introduction of supplemental
examination into the patent system raises a number of questions. In
particular, the new law includes a requirement that the USPTO refer
incidents of suspected prosecution-related fraud to the Attorney General
for investigation if the USPTO becomes aware of such circumstances.8
Registered practitioners are not only duty-bound, however, to refrain
from fraud. 9 They, as well as inventors and others who participate
substantively in patent prosecution and reexamination, have a broader
duty of candor.' 0 Under pre-AIA law, both the patent owner and the
responsible practitioner could be penalized as a result of an intentional
violation of the duty of candor." Using supplemental examination,
however, an owner can decouple the enforceability of the patent from a
prior candor violation, leaving the practitioner who is alleged or
suspected to have committed the violation to face any potential
consequences. 2 These changes create implementation issues for the
USPTO, potential ethics and tactical issues for practitioners, and
questions about the impact of the new proceeding on the patent system,
generally.

4. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 735, 737 n.2 (2011) (collecting studies relating to the frequency with
which the defense is pled); Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit
and Inequitable Conduct, 84 S. CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1308-09 (2011) (reporting the frequency with
which patent owners succeed on the issue of inequitable conduct in written Federal Circuit
decisions).
5. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 49-50, 86-90 and accompanying text.
9. 37 C.F.R. § 10.23(b)(4) (2012).
10. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56, 1.555 (2012).
11. Jay Erstling, PatentLaw and the Duty of Candor:Rethinking the Limits of Disclosure,44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 329-30 (2011).
12. See infra Part III.B.3.
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For example, what role, if any, will the USPTO Office of
Enrollment and Discipline play in policing candor violations suggested
by requests for supplemental examination?13 How might this new
opportunity to liberate a patent from the consequences of possible
misconduct in its procurement affect the attorney-client relationship and
the practitioner who originally prosecuted the patent? 14 Will patent
owners embrace supplemental examination, or will they avoid it either
because other post-grant opportunities now exist for the consideration of
information that might ground an inequitable conduct charge, or out of
concern that supplemental examination requests might invite unwanted
scrutiny? 15
This paper considers these duty-of-candor-related issues-issues
that the USPTO, the courts, patent owners, and patent challengers may
face in the wake of the enactment of the AIA's provisions relating to
supplemental examination, But first, by way of background, Part II
presents an overview of the legislation relating to supplemental
examination and explores how supplemental examination might operate,
in light of its apparent goals. Part III considers questions relating to the
overlay of supplemental examination on the existing U.S. patent
application and enforcement regime, with particular focus on its
interplay with the applicant's duty of candor. As that section illustrates,
the focal point of that examination is the supplemental examination
request. Accordingly, Part III introduces the discussion of the candorrelated questions raised by supplemental examination by considering the
range and nature of information such requests may contain. Part IV
concludes.
II. SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION: LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK, GOALS,
AND OPERATION

A.

Supplemental Examination in the AIA

The new supplemental examination proceeding will afford patent
owners the opportunity to secure USPTO consideration of information
that might otherwise give rise to an inequitable conduct challenge. In
particular, section 12 of the AIA establishes a new section 257 in Title
35, U.S. Code, with six principal subsections, entitled "Request for
Supplemental Examination," "Reexamination Ordered," "Effect," "Fees

13.
14.

See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.3.

15. See infra Part III.B.4.
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and Regulations," "Fraud," and "Rule of Construction." 16 Subpart (a)
introduces supplemental examination, as follows:
(a) Request for Supplemental Examination- A patent owner may
request supplemental examination of a patent in the Office to consider,
reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the patent,
in accordance with such requirements as the Director may establish.
Within 3 months after the date a request for supplemental examination
meeting the requirements of this section is received, the Director shall
conduct the supplemental examination and shall conclude such
examination by issuing a certificate indicating whether the information
presented in the request raises a substantial new question of
patentability.' 7
Thus, the AIA creates a new USPTO proceeding designated as a
"supplemental examination." 18 The purpose is "to consider, reconsider,
or correct information believed to be relevant to the patent" that is the
subject of the request. 19 The USPTO is charged with evaluating the
information presented in the request under the familiar reexamination
standard:
"whether [it] raises a substantial new question of
patentability,' '2 and it will have three months to make that
determination. 2 1 OnlyS• the
22 patent owner will be able to request a
supplemental examination.
The next section of the legislation sets forth the consequences of a
USPTO determination that the request raises a substantial new question
of patentability:
(b) Reexamination Ordered- If the certificate issued under subsection
(a) indicates that a substantial new question of patentability is raised by
1 or more items of information in the request, the Director shall order
reexamination of the patent. The reexamination shall be conducted
according to procedures established by chapter 30, except that the
16. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 12, 125 Stat. 284, 325-27 (2011).
17. Id. at 325.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. "If... the Director finds that a substantial new question of patentability affecting any
claim of a patent is raised, the determination will include an order for reexamination of the patent
for resolution of the question." 35 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West 2011). See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that "[tihe 'substantial new question of patentability'
requirement prevents potential harassment of patentees by 'act[ing] to bar reconsideration of any
argument already decided by the [USPTO], whether during the original examination or an earlier
reexamination."' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1307(1) (1980); U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6460, 6466(1980)).
21. See 125 Stat. at 326.
22. See id.
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patent owner shall not have the right to file a statement pursuant to
section 304. During the reexamination, the Director shall address each
substantial new question of patentability identified during the
supplemental examination, notwithstanding the limitations in chapter
30 relating to2 patents
and printed publication or any other provision of
3
chapter.
such
According to the new law, the consequence of a USPTO
determination that any of the information in the request for supplemental
examination raises a substantial new question of patentability will be a
reexamination proceeding which differs from the usual ex parte
reexamination in two principal respects. First, the patent owner (who
filed the request for supplemental examination in the first place) will be
barred from submitting a statement. 24 Second, and significantly, the
restriction limiting reexamination to consideration of "patents and
printed publications '25 will not apply, and "information" is not
otherwise limited or defined in the legislation. Accordingly, a patent
owner will be able to use supplemental examination not only to bring to
the attention of the USPTO prior art patents and printed publications, but
also non-print prior art (such as pre-critical date sales and public uses)
and non-prior art information of the kind the Federal Circuit had held to
be material for purposes of the inequitable conduct defense, prior to its
recent en banc decision overhauling that doctrine. 26 Such non-prior art
information includes:
* unpublished notes taken by a non-inventor, co-employee at
27
a poster presentation,
* a non-prior art article
relevant to whether the claims at
28
issue were enabled,
*

a third-party's patent application (in the inventor's
possession) and information regarding the third-party's

23. Id.
24. Having filed the supplemental examination request in the first place, the patent owner will
presumably have had its say.
25. 35 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West 2011) authorizes "[a]ny person [to] file a request for
reexamination ... of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of
section 301," which authorizes the citation of "prior art consisting of patents or printed
publications." See id.
26. In May 2011, the Federal Circuit issued its en banc decision in Therasense,Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As discussed infra notes 63-64 and
accompanying text, the court adopted a new, narrower definition of materiality for purposes of
inequitable conduct.
27. Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Biosciences N.V., 514 F.3d 1229, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
28. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234-35 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
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model29 of his own invention (which the inventor had
seen),

*

"intentional
falsehoods,
misrepresentations,
and
30
nondisclosures" relating to inventorship,
* a false statement in a Petition to Make Special, 3 and
* unjustified claims to small entity status.
Some such non prior-art information (without more) clearly will not
raise a "substantial new question of patentability," 33 and even more
clearly will not satisfy the Federal Circuit's new "but-for" materiality
standard. 34 However, at least where there is doubt about how a court
might regard information-prior art or otherwise-that was (or was
arguably) not considered (or inadequately considered) by the USPTO
during original (or a prior) prosecution, a patent owner might well elect
to pursue supplemental examination. New section 257(c) of the Patent
Act sets forth the preemptive protection a patent owner can obtain via
supplemental examination:
(c) Effect(1) IN GENERAL- A patent shall not be held unenforceable on the
basis of conduct relating to information that had not been considered,
was inadequately considered, or was incorrect in a prior examination

29. GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1274-75 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
30. PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1317, 1320 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
31. Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., 528 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Gen. Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
32. See Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Ulead Sys.,
Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
33. "The presence or absence of a 'substantial new question of patentability' determines
whether or not reexamination is ordered." MPEP § 2242 (8th ed. 2008). According to the
USPTO's proposed rules for implementing supplemental examination,
[t]he decision as to whether the information submitted in a request for supplemental
examination raises a substantial new question of patentability is identical to the decision
as to whether the information submitted in a request for ex pare reexamination raises a
substantial new question of patentability, except that the information submitted in a
request for supplemental examination is not limited to patents and publications.
Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act and To Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 3666, 3668 (Jan. 25, 2012). In ex
parte reexamination,"[a] prior art patent or printed publication raises a substantial question of
patentability where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider the
prior art patent or printed publication important in deciding whether or not the claim is patentable."
MPEP § 2242. Accordingly, in supplemental examination, information will raise a substantial new
question of patentability where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would
consider the information important in deciding whether or not a claim is patentable.
34. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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of the patent if the information was considered, reconsidered, or
corrected during a supplemental examination of the patent. The
makina of a request under subsection (a), or the absence thereof
3 shall
not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section 282.
This is the key provision in the supplemental examination portion
of the AIA. Except as discussed below, the legislation strips the courts
of the power to hold patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct in
cases where the patentee has previously secured, via supplemental
examination, USPTO consideration of the information the patent
challenger alleges was withheld or misrepresented. 36 A patent owner
will be able to use supplemental examination to "consider, reconsider, or
correct" information it knows or believes was not considered, was
"inadequately considered, or was incorrect" during the initial
examination
or during a post-grant examination,
such as
reexamination. 37 That a supplemental examination request was filed
(or
38
was not filed) will not otherwise bear on the patent's enforceability.
The injunction against a determination of unenforceability will not
operate if either of two statutory exceptions applies:
(2) EXCEPTIONS-

(A) PRIOR ALLEGATIONS- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an
allegation pled with particularity in a civil action, or set forth with
particularity in a notice received by the patent owner under section
505(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21
U.S.C. 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II)), before the date of a supplemental
examination request under subsection (a) to consider, reconsider, or
correct information forming the basis for the allegation.
(B) PATENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS- In an action brought
under section 337(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337(a)), or
section 281 of this title, paragraph (1) shall not apply to any defense
raised in the action that is based upon information that was considered,
reconsidered, or corrected pursuant to a supplemental examination
request under subsection (a), unless the supplemental examination, and
any reexamination ordered oursuant to the 39request, are concluded
before the date on which the action is brought.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 12, § 257(c), 125 Stat. 284, 326 (2011).
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 326.
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These exceptions relate to timing, and will be triggered by specified
events. Under section 257(c)(2)(B), a patent owner contemplating an
enforcement action (either in the district courts or in the International
Trade Commission) and seeking to head off an anticipated inequitable
conduct charge based on particular information, will only obtain the
benefit of the section 257(c)(1) protection if the USPTO has concluded
its supplemental examination of that information (at the patent owner's
request) andany resulting
reexamination before the patent owner files its
40
enforcement action.
The exception in new section 257(c)(2)(A) will apply when the
patent challenger (as opposed to the patent owner) makes the first move,
for example, by filing a declaratory judgment action or answer to
complaint containing particularized allegations of inequitable conduct,
or by sending the patent owner a Paragraph IV letter 4 1 before the patent
owner files a supplemental examination request. 41 In such a case,
supplemental examination
will not preclude litigation of the inequitable
43
conduct defense at issue.

40. See id.
41. Pursuant to portions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156,
271, 282 (2003)), a brand-name drug manufacturer who has obtained Food & Drug Administration
("FDA") marketing approval for its drug product through the FDA "New Drug Application"
("NDA") approval process must notify the FDA of all patents that "claim the drug for which the
[NDA] applicant submitted the application . . . and with respect to which a claim of patent
infringement could reasonably be asserted .... " 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (c)(2) (2006). The FDA
publication that identifies such patents is known as the "Orange Book." A generic drug
manufacturer who wishes to utilize the FDA's "Abbreviated New Drug Application" process (and
thereby obtaining marketing approval for the generic drug product by virtue of its bioequivalence
with the NDA-approved drug) must certify that:
(I) that such [Orange Book] patent information has not been filed, (II) that such patent
has expired, (III)... the date on which such patent will expire, or (IV) that such patent is
invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for
which the application is submitted ....
21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I-IV)(2006).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006), the filing of an ANDA "for a drug claimed in a
patent" constitutes an act of patent infringement if the ANDA applicant seeks approval to market
the generic drug before the expiration of the patent(s) at issue (i.e., files a "Paragraph IV"
certification). If the patent owner does not file suit against the ANDA applicant within forty-five
days after receiving the required notice of the ANDA filing, the FDA is authorized to approve the
ANDA. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006). However, if/when the ANDA application commences
marketing the generic drug product, the patent owner is free to sue the ANDA for infringement.
42. Other commentators appear to have read section 257(c)(2) somewhat differently. See
Bruce M. Wexler, Preston K. Ratliff II & Jason T. Christiansen, Will Inequitable Conduct Finally
Be Reformed?, LAW 360 (June 29, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/172626 (discussing
corresponding provisions in an earlier version of the legislation).
43. See 125 Stat. at 326.
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These two exceptions will operate to encourage patent owners to
seek (and complete) supplemental examination (and any resulting
reexamination) regarding any potentially problematic information before
filing suit. A patent challenger who wants to press an inequitable
conduct defense, on the other hand, will have to assert that defense-in a
declaratory judgment complaint, an answer to an infringement
complaint, or a Paragraph IV letter-before the patentee initiates a
supplemental examination. Note that in either case, the patentee will
retain control over the situation because the patentee will decide when to
file suit or take another enforcement-related step that will constitute the
kind of "affirmative act" necessary to trigger declaratory
judgment
45
jurisdiction 44 or list its patent(s) in the FDA Orange Book.
The AIA includes provisions relating to fee-setting and rulemaking:
(d) Fees and Regulations(1) FEES- The Director shall, by regulation, establish fees for the
submission of a request for supplemental examination of a patent, and
to consider each item of information submitted in the request. If
reexamination is ordered under subsection (b), fees established and
applicable to ex parte reexamination proceedings under chapter 30
shall be paid, in addition to fees applicable to supplemental
examination.
(2) REGULATIONS- The Director shall issue regulations governing
the form, content, and other requirements of requests for supplemental
examination,
and establishing
procedures for reviewing information
• •
46
submitted in such requests.
This section requires the USPTO to set fees for the filing and
consideration of supplemental examination requests, and in addition, to
collect the fees applicable to ex parte reexamination where
reexamination is ordered. 4 7 It also requires the USPTO to 48
establish rules
governing the submission and processing of such requests.

44. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380-81 (Fed. Cit. 2007)
("[J]urisdiction generally will not arise merely on the basis that a party learns of the existence of a
patent owned by another or even perceives such a patent to pose a risk of infringement, without
some affirmative act by the patentee.").
45. Seesupranote4l.
46. 125 Stat. at 326.
47. See id.
48. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012

9

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 6 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 1

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[6:147

The next section of the legislation specifies what is to happen if the
Director "becomes aware . . . that a material fraud on the Office may
have been committed in connection with the [subject] patent":
(e) Fraud- If the Director becomes aware, during the course of a
supplemental examination or reexamination proceeding ordered under
this section, that a material fraud on the Office may have been
committed in connection with the patent that is the subject of the
supplemental examination, then in addition to any other actions the
Director is authorized to take, including the cancellation of any claims
found to be invalid under section 307 as a result of a reexamination
ordered under this section, the Director shall also refer the matter to the
Attorney General for such further action as the Attorney General may
deem appropriate. Any such referral shall be treated as confidential,
shall not be included in the file of the patent, and shall not be disclosed
a person with a criminal
to the public unless the United States charges
49
offense in connection with such referral.
The consequences of such a determination by the Director include "the
cancellation of any [invalid] claims" and a confidential referral of "the
matter to the Attorney General for such further action as the Attorney
General may deem appropriate," "in addition to any other actions the
Director is authorized to take .... "50
This section was not included in the original legislative proposal
relating to supplemental examination. 5 1 A subsequent proposal would
have barred supplemental examination "regarding ... an application or
patent in connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or
attempted." 52 No such bar was included in the version that became law,
the USPTO to refer cases of suspected fraud to the
which instead directs
53
Attorney General.
The AIA also includes several provisions relating to aspects of the
law that are unaffected by the introduction of supplemental examination:
(f) Rule of Construction-

Nothing in this section shall be construed-

49. Id. at 326-27.
50. Id.
51. See Draft substitute for S. 515, 111 th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010) (designated the "Patent
Reform Act of 2010"), discussed in Lisa A. Dolak, Supplemental Examinations to Consider,
Reconsider, or Correct Patent-Related Information: A Tangled Web Indeed (July 29, 2010),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1 650648.
52. H.R. REP. No. 112-098 (2011) ("No supplemental examination may be commenced by the
Director on, and any pending supplemental examination shall be immediately terminated regarding,
an application or patent in connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted.").
53. See 125 Stat. at 326-27. The provision relating to fraud is discussed further infra notes
86-90 and accompanying text.
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(1) to preclude the imposition of sanctions based upon criminal or

antitrust laws (including section 1001(a) of title 18, the first sectionof
the Clayton Act, and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to
the extent that section relates to unfair methods of competition);
(2) to limit the authority of the Director to investigate issues of
possible misconduct and impose sanctions for misconduct in
connection with matters or proceedings before the Office; or
(3) to limit the authority of the Director to issue regulations under
chaoter 3 relating to sanctions
for misconduct by representatives
54
practicing before the Office.
In particular, new section 257(f) expressly disavows any effect on
the existing law relating to criminal and antitrust liability, and preserves
the USPTO's power to regulate the conduct of those who practice 55
before
the Office and to investigate and impose sanctions for misconduct.
New section 257 will take effect "upon the expiration of the 1-year
period beginning on the date of the enactment" of the AIA-i.e., on
September 16, 2012, and will "apply to any patent issued before, on, or
after that date." 5 6 Thus, once the supplemental examinations provisions
are in effect patent owners can use them to anticipatorily defeat potential
inequitable conduct charges relating to any of their issued, pending, or
future patents.
B.

Supplemental Examination in Context

The emergence of the supplemental examination concept in the
legislative lead-up to the enactment of the AIA 57 was unsurprising,
given the then-increasing dissatisfaction with the courts' application of
58
Business representatives,
the inequitable conduct doctrine.
legislators, 59 commentators (this commentator included), 6 1 and even

54. Id.at 327.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., The PatentReform Act of 2007: Hearings on H.R. 1908 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Propertyof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 43-44
(2007) (hereinafter "Hearings on H.R. 1908"] (statement of Kevin Sharer, CEO and Chairman of
the Board of Amgen, Inc.) ("When a patent is litigated, the most innocent statements, or failures to
disclose the smallest thing, can become the bases for charges of inequitable conduct.").
59. See, e.g., Hatch Makes Inequitable Conduct Defense, NAT'L J. TECH DAILY DOSE, Mar.
18, 2009, available at http://techdailydose.nationaljoumal.com/2009/03/hatch-makes-inequitable-
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the judges having the power to shape the doctrine 6 2 had spilled volumes
of ink analyzing and critiquing developments in inequitable conduct law.
The foment led, ultimately, to the Federal Circuit's reconsideration en
banc of the inequitable conduct doctrine in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co. 6 3 In its May 2011 Therasense decision, the court
adopted a heightened standard for evaluating the materiality of
information alleged to have been withheld from or misrepresented to the
USPTO, 64 reiterated that deceptive intent cannot be inferred from
circumstantial evidence unless it is "'the single most reasonable
inference able to be drawn from the evidence,"' 5 and held that "[a]
district court should not use a 'sliding scale' where a weak showing of

conduc.php ("The inequitable conduct defense is frequently pled, rarely proven, and always drives
up the cost of litigation, [Senator Hatch] said. If an inequitable conduct claim wins, a valid patent
will be held entirely void, and the infringer walks away without any liability, he added. There is
,virtually no downside for the infringer to raise this type of attack."') (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch, RUtah).
60. See, e.g., Chris Mammen, A Call to Reform Inequitable Conduct This Year,
IPWATCHDOG, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/04/09/a-call-to-reform-inequitableconduct-this-year/id=2482/ ("Reform of the inequitable conduct doctrine is needed."); Kate
McElhone, Inequitable Conduct: Shifting Standards for Patent Applicants, Prosecutors, and
Litigators, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 385, 387-88 (2009) ("To settle the law of inequitable conduct
and provide definitive guidance in this area, Congress should overrule recent Federal Circuit
precedent and the PTO's proposed rules by amending the Patent Act."); Arti K. Rai, Growing
Pains in the AdministrativeState: The Patent Office's Troubled Questfor ManagerialControl, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2079 (2009) ("The progress that could be achieved through inequitableconduct reform is difficult to overstate.").
61. See, e.g., Lisa A. Dolak, Inequitable Conduct: A Flawed Doctrine Worth Saving, 11
WAKE FOREST J. Bus. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2010).
62. See, e.g., Larson Mfg. Co. v. Aluminart Prod. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Linn, J., dissenting) ("[Our] precedent has significantly diverged from the Supreme Court's
treatment of inequitable conduct and perpetuates what was once referred to as a 'plague' that our en
banc court sought to cure in Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. HollisterInc., 863 F.2d 867,
876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418,
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ('[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent
case has become an absolute plague.'))"); McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487
F.3d 897, 926-27 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("This court returns to the 'plague' of
encouraging unwarranted charges of inequitable conduct, spawning the opportunistic litigation that
here succeeded despite consistently contrary precedent."); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 437 F.3d
1181, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The panel majority, steeped in adverse
inferences, holds that good faith is irrelevant and presumes bad faith. Thus the court resurrects the
plague of the past, ignoring the Kingsdown requirements of clear and convincing evidence of a
misrepresentation or omission material to patentability, made intentionally and for the purpose of
deception.").
63. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickenson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
64. Id. at 1291 ("[A]s a general matter, the materiality required to establish inequitable
conduct is but-for materiality.").
65. Id. at 1290 (quoting Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
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intent may be found sufficient based on a strong showing of materiality,
and vice versa." 66 These changes should make it more difficult for
patent challengers to establish inequitable conduct in the future.
Despite the intervening developments in Therasense, the proposal
for supplemental examination remained in the pending patent reform
legislation and was ultimately included in the AIA as enacted, albeit in
somewhat-revised form. 6 7 The structure and content of the legislation's
provisions relating to supplemental examination suggest that it will
operate as discussed in the next section.
C.

Supplemental Examination in Operation

The obvious goals of the supplemental examination provision are to
provide patent owners a forum for vetting information that might
otherwise ground an inequitable conduct defense to the enforcement of
their patents, and a vehicle they can use to deprive the courts of the
power they would otherwise have to hold even a patent that had been
68
reexamined by the USPTO unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
Patent owners can use supplemental examination to preempt inequitable
conduct challenges and all of the associated uncertainty, expense, and in
terrorem effects. 6 9 A patent owner who identifies information that was
(or arguably was) incorrect, not considered, or inadequately considered
during original (or another prior) prosecution can effectively take the
issue of inequitable conduct relating to that information off the
table
70
before either filing suit or taking other steps to enforce the patent.

66. Id.
67. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
68. Pre-Therasense, the Federal Circuit had refused to allow patent owners to "cure"
inequitable conduct via USPTO consideration of the information at issue in reexamination or
reissue. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,
326 F.3d 1226, 1241
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that a patent owner's "disclosure [of material information] during reissue
is irrelevant to the inquiry of whether [it] acquired the [patent in question] by engaging in
inequitable conduct").
69. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. See also Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine: Lessons from Recent Cases, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 719 (2002)
("[E]ven well before the summary judgment or trial phases of litigation, the in terrorem effects of
any colorable inequitable conduct allegation can significantly alter the balance between the
litigants."); Philip Abromats, Nondisclosure of Preexisting Works in Software Copyright
Registrations: Inequitable Conduct in Need of a Remedy, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 571, 581 (1992)
("Because of its unsettled nature, some have assailed the inequitable conduct defense in patent law.
The most common criticism is that it is impossible to determine in advance which types of conduct
will be held inequitable, leading to an in terrorem effect on patent holders and encouraging
defendants to raise the defense in virtually every case.")
70. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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Of course, if the information the patent owner submits raises "a
substantial new question of patentability" regarding one or more of the
claims of the patent, the patent will be ordered into reexamination,
where the patent owner could be required to cancel or amend one or
more claims in light of the submitted information. 7 1 But, assuming that
the patent owner emerges with one or more claims that are potentially
infringed by the putative defendant, the patent owner is in a substantially
better position than had it proceeded against the defendant without first
taking advantage of supplemental examination, even if intervening rights
have attached.
In the latter circumstance, the patent owner risked a
judicial determination that all claims of the patent---even those that were
valid and infringed-were unenforceable. 73
By first invoking
supplemental
examination,
instead,
the
patent
owner
has stronger
S 74
claims that are immune from attack on the basis that the patent owner
had previously withheld or misrepresented the newly considered
information with the intent to deceive the USPTO. 75 It has blunted the
threat of unenforceability and significantly diminished
its opponent's
76
leverage in this respect in the anticipated litigation.
It has also effectively obtained consideration of the submitted
information under a "but- for" materiality standard. 7 7 The supplemental
examination proceeding is actually better, from the point of view of a
patent owner, than the "but-for" materiality standard for inequitable
conduct because a "but-for" materiality finding in litigation could still
71. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 302, 303 (West 2011).
72. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 307(b) (West 2011) ("Any proposed amended or new claim determined
to be patentable and incorporated into a patent following a reexamination proceeding will have the
same effect as that specified in section 252 of this title for reissued patents on the right of any
person who made, purchased, or used within the United States, or imported into the United States,
anything patented by such proposed amended or new claim, or who made substantial preparation for
the same, prior to issuance of a certificate under the provisions of subsection (a) of this section.").
73. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 ("[l]nequitable conduct regarding any single claim renders
the entire patent unenforceable.") (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863
F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
74. See Tremesha S. Willis, Note, Patent ReexaminationPost Litigation: It's Time to Set the
Rules Straight, 12 J. INTELL PROP. L. 597, 601-02 (2005) ("If a patent passes reexamination muster
and maintains its validity, the patentee will have a stronger patent .
.
75. See supranotes 35-38 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., William C. Rooklidge & Alyson G. Barker, Reform of a Fast-Moving Target:
The Development of Patent Law Since the 2004 National Academies Report, 91 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 153 (2009) ("[T]he [inequitable conduct] defense injects significant cost,
complexity and uncertainty in patent infringement lawsuits that accused infringers find valuable as
leverage in seeking favorable settlements with patent owners or, when the allegations prove
successful, avoiding paying damages on otherwise valid and infringed patents.").
77. Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine,
53 Az. L. REv. 735, 744-45 (2011).
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culminate in a determination of unenforceability. In contrast, a patent
could
survive
a "but-for"
determination
in supplemental
examination/reexamination, and emerge with claims that are narrower
but invigorated, and that still read on the products of potential
infringement defendants. Moreover, the supplemental examination
proceeding affords the patent owner the opportunity to have the "but-forness" of the information evaluated in an ex parte proceeding by a
technically-trained expert in the USPTO instead, potentially,
by a lay
78
jury in a hotly contested interpartesaction in federal court.
Furthermore, supplemental examination is available not only to
"consider, reconsider, or correct information" that was innocently or
negligently withheld or misrepresented during a prior prosecution, but
also to "cure" actual inequitable conduct. 79 Even, in other words, where
the patent owner knew of, participated in or orchestrated the withholding
or misrepresentation of material information and did so with the intent to
deceive the USPTO, the patent owner can utilize supplemental
examination to "scrub" the patent in anticipation of enforcement. 80 This
is because the legislation makes deceptive intent in the procurement of
patent rights irrelevant, 81 except where and to the extent that "the
Director becomes aware, during the course of a supplemental
examination [or associated reexamination], that a material fraud on the
Office may have been committed in connection
with the patent that is
82
the subject of the supplemental examination."
78. Either way, under Therasense, the materiality determination is to be made under the
"preponderance of the evidence" evidentiary burden and the "broadest reasonable construction"
claim construction. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291-92.
79. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, see. 12, § 257, 125 Stat. 284, 325-27 (2011).
See also Gerald M. Murphy, Jr., Ethical Considerationsin Post-GrantProceedings, 1078 PLU/PAT
151, 176 (2012) ("Supplemental Examination provides a "cure" for any inequitable conduct that
may have occurred.").
80. Serious breaches of the duty of candor have occurred. See, e.g., Applied Materials, Inc. v.
Multimetrixs, LLC, No. C 06-07372 MHP, 2008 WL 2892453 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2008) (holding a
patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct based on the submission of a signature forged after the
inventor's death); Armament Sys. & Procedures, Inc. v. IQ Hong Kong Ltd., No. 00-C-1257, 2007
WL 2154237, at *22 (E.D. Wis. July 24, 2007) (finding that a drawing submitted as part of a Rule
131 declaration and dated 1997 was actually drawn in 2002, and holding the affected patent
unenforceable); Grefco, Inc. v. Kewanee Indus., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 844 (D. Del. 1980) (holding a
patent unenforceable as procured through fraud where the patentee misrepresented test results and
told the examiner that the invention had been successfully tested when in fact it had actually failed
two tests), aff'd withoutpubl opinion,671 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1981).
81. Robert A. Armitage, The Role of the America Invents Act in Ending the Plague of
"Inequitable Conduct" Allegations, 4 No. 3 LANDSLIDE 1 (2012) ("All references to "deceptive
intent" are stripped out of the patent statute. Remedial measures that have been heretofore
dependent upon the ability to show absence of deceptive intent are no more.").
82. 125 Stat. at 326-27.
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For example, suppose that a patent owner (or an attorney or agent
acting on the owner's behalf) purposefully concealed a highly material
prior art reference during original examination. The patent owner knew
that the reference would have precluded the issuance of the broadest
claim---claim 1-of the patent, and for that reason did not disclose the
reference. Now comes time to enforce the patent. The patent owner
conducts an infringement analysis, and determines that the infringement
target's products infringe the narrowest claims of the patent, and likely
infringe the claims of medium scope. And further assume, that in any
event, the broad claim does not enhance the patentee's infringement
position; the limitations that might preclude a finding of infringement of
the claims of medium scope are found, as well, in claim 1.
The supplemental examination proceeding is ideally suited for such
a patentee. Before filing suit or engaging in any sword-rattling vis-6t-vis
the target, the patent owner can submit the previously-withheld reference
in a request for supplemental examination. In the above hypothetical,
the submission would trigger reexamination, because surely a previously
unconsidered reference that anticipates or renders obvious claim 1 of the
patent raises "a substantial new question of patentability." 83 Further, in
reexamination, the USPTO would (correctly) reject claim 1 as
unpatentable, forcing the patent owner to either cancel or narrow it. But
for the reasons stated above, the patent owner's infringement position is
unaffected by the amendment, and its validity position has been
enhanced. And the courts are, by statute, precluded from considering the
target's charge that the patent was procured via inequitable conduct,
even if provable with clearly and convincing evidence.84 The patent
owner has managed to expunge8 5its inequitable conduct-something that
it cannot do under existing law.
The only exception is where the "the Director becomes aware,
during the course of a supplemental examination [or associated
reexamination], that a material fraud on the Office may have been
committed in connection with the patent that is the subject of the
supplemental examination. ' ' 6 But this exception is narrow in stated
scope, and likely even narrower in actual practice.
First, the universe of cases potentially implicated by this exception
are those in which "a material fraud ... may have been committed" on

83.
84.
85.
86.

35 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West 2011).
See supranotes 35-38 and accompanying text.
125 Stat. at 325-27.
Id. at 326-27.
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the USPTO. 87 Second, the exception only applies where "the Director
becomes aware" of the possibility that such fraud occurred."8 8 For
several reasons, even where a material fraud was perpetrated, the
Director may well not "become aware" of it.89 It is also worth noting
that triggering the "material fraud" exception does not adversely affect
the enforceability of the patent at issue.
The supplemental examination proceeding will also serve, of
course, to assist a patentee who discovers an innocent mistake during
pre-enforcement review, or one who gets advance notice (in licensing
negotiations, for example) of a potential defendant's inequitable conduct
theory.
The creation of supplemental examinations is commendable in
several respects. It can protect innocent patent owners and practitioners
against baseless, but costly and damaging, charges of prosecution
misconduct.
It can protect innocent patent owners from the
consequences of practitioner misconduct, and innocent assignees and
exclusive licensees from being left with an unenforceable patent as a
result of negligent or intentional candor violations.
It will also encourage careful pre-enforcement review by patentees.
The timing provisions tend to discourage the worst possible scenario;
without them, a patent owner could knowingly flout its candor and
disclosure obligations during prosecution and plan to use supplemental
examination to clean up any problems identified by a future enforcement
target.9 1 On the other hand, however, the timing provisions may
discourage patent challengers from tendering potentially damaging
information during license negotiations (to avoid tipping off the patent
owner), and thus could make such negotiations less efficient.
In addition, by requiring the patentee to wait for the supplemental
examination and any resulting reexamination proceeding to be
concluded before filing suit as a condition of obtaining the preemptive
protection, it avoids disrupting the litigation with the uncertainties
associated with parallel USPTO proceedings and satellite disputes
regarding litigation stays. And even in the above-described hypothetical
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See supranotes 49-50 and accompanying text.
91. To be sure, such a patent owner-and any patent owner who would initiate supplemental
examination-would risk loss of claim scope or even the entire patent in a potential follow-on
reexamination. However, as discussed above, in some cases the patent owner would be able to
"thread the needle", i.e., eliminate the threat of unenforceability by disclosing the previously un- or
inadequately-disclosed information while preserving claims of valuable scope.
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where the patent owner uses the proceeding to avoid the consequences
of its prior misconduct, the new regime has the benefit of streamlining
the enforcement litigation.
The creation of supplemental examinations is an improvement over
prior proposals to strip the courts ofjurisdiction to adjudicate inequitable
conduct defenses, 92 in that it will require patent owners to take
affirmative, risk-entailing, patent-quality-enhancing steps to obtain its
benefits. It does, however, reflect a viewpoint that all that matters is
validity, i.e., that claims that the USPTO decides are patentable should
not be held unenforceable even if the applicant intentionally withheld or
misrepresented material information during their procurement.
As discussed below, it also raises duty of candor-related questions
for the USPTO, the courts, patent owners, challengers, and practitioners.
These questions relate one way or another, ultimately, to the content of
the supplemental examination request. The next section considers what
such requests might include in particular circumstances and illustrates
how supplemental examination requests might raise candor-related
questions.
III. SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION REQUESTS: CONTEXT AND

CANDOR-RELATED QUESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

A.

A SubstantialNew Question of Patentability?

A number of the questions raised by the introduction of
supplemental examinations relate to the content of supplemental
examination requests. The USPTO has now issued proposed rules to
implement these new proceedings, and those proposed rules include
requirements for93the inclusion of specific information and explanations
in such requests.
As noted above, it appears that Congress intended to render
irrelevant any deceptive intent underlying the original disclosure failure

92. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (lst Sess. 2005) ("No court
or Federal department or agency other than the Office, and no other Federal or State governmental
entity, may investigate or make a determination or an adjudication with respect to an alleged
violation of the duty of candor and good faith under subsection (a) or with respect to an alleged
fraud, inequitable conduct, or other misconduct in any proceeding before the Office involving a
patent or in connection with the filing or examination of an application for patent, except as
expressly permitted in this section.").
93. Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act and To Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 3666, 3669-72 (Jan. 25,
2012).
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94
or misstatement, subject to the limited "material fraud" exception.
Accordingly, the USPTO's proposed rules do not require the patent
5
owner to explain why the omission or misrepresentation was made.
However, the legislation does require the USPTO to determine
whether the information contained in a supplemental examination
request raises "a substantial new question of patentability." 96 And, the
new law requires the USPTO to promulgate "regulations governing the
form, content and other requirements of requests for supplemental
examination." 7 Accordingly, the issue of what patent owners will have
to say has been left to the USPTO.
This issue has particular significance given the legislative design.
The central purpose is to create an opportunity for the USPTO to
consider information that the patent owner believes (or believes that a
potential infringement defendant might assert) should have been
98
considered by the USPTO in the original or another prior examination.
To fulfill this purpose, it would seem necessary that the request present
that information fairly and in enough specificity to facilitate the
USPTO's evaluation of its effect on the patentability of the claims of the
patent. Moreover, the USPTO will be required, in supplemental
examination, to make the same determination it must make in response
to the filing of an ex parte reexamination request: whether the
information presented raises "a substantial99 new question of
patentability"--and to do so within three months.
The issue of what patent owners will have to say is complicated,
however, by the fact that supplemental examination is not limited to
patents and printed publications. 100 A patent or printed publication
reveals (at least to a person of ordinary skill in the art) its scope and
content on its face; it speaks for itself, in that regard. And while some
supplemental examination requests will disclose patents and printed
publications, patent owners can be expected to use the proceeding to
bring to the attention of the USPTO all kinds of other information, prior
art and non-prior art.
For example, patent owners may seek to disclose pre-critical date
sales and public uses, information relating to inventorship, unpublished

94.
95.
America
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith
Invents Act and To Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 3666-81 (Jan. 25, 2012).
35 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West 2011).
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 12, § 257(d), 125 Stat. 284, 326 (2011).
See supranotes 17-19 and accompanying text.
35 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West 2011).
See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
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notes, materials relevant to enablement, office actions and other
documents from co-pending applications, litigation papers and
proceedings, representations to foreign patent offices, and facts pertinent
to the interests and relationships of affiants, statements made in petitions
to make special, and the small-entity status of applicants and patent
owners.10 1 Depending on the circumstances, some of these might
"speak for themselves" like patents and printed publications. But the
USPTO will need details and context relating to certain kinds of
information in order to evaluate its significance for the patentability of
the claims at issue.
For some categories of non-prior art information, such as erroneous
prior representations about small entity status, the USPTO would
presumably be able to readily conclude that such information has no
bearing on substantive patentability. In other situations, however, the
USPTO will not be able to make a call regarding the impact of the
information on patentability without some elaboration by the patent
owner.
Assume, for example, that the information pertains to a pre-critical
date sale. At a minimum, the USPTO would need the date of the sale (or
at least a statement that it occurred more than a year before the filing
date of the application in the United States), its location (whether or not
it occurred in the United States), and a description of what was on sale.
Sales outside the United States, or that occurred within a year before the
filing of the application per se cannot raise a substantial question of
patentability, and the USPTO would need to know what product or
service was on sale in order to determine its relevance under 35 U.S.C. §
102 or 35 U.S.C. § 103. Depending on the circumstances, additional
facts might matter. For example, the USPTO might need to know the
circumstances of the sale and/or the identities and relationship of the
parties. 102 If the sale was transnational, further details might be required
to facilitate the USPTO's determination of whether it was or was not "in
this country. ' 1°3 The stage of development of the invention at the time
of the sale (or as of the critical date) might make a difference. These are
just examples of the kinds of disclosures the patent owner might need or
might volunteer to make in a supplemental examination request.

101. See, e.g., supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (identifying examples of information
on which inequitable conduct allegations have been based).
102. See, e.g., Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 182 F.3d 888, 890 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (examining its precedent relating to sales between related entities for purposes of the on sale
bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2011)).
103. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 2011).
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Even if the patent owner admitted that the sale qualified as prior art,
the USPTO would need to know what was sold, and even this
description would necessarily entail characterizations. The point is that
some supplemental examination requests will include detailed
descriptions of products, events, and other facts.
The USPTO's proposed rules reflect these realities. Under the
proposal, the patent owner would be required, for example, to include in
its supplemental examination request:
a statement that: (1) Identifies each item of information that was not
considered in the prior examination of the patent, and explains why
consideration of the item is being requested; (2) identifies each item of
information that was not adequately considered in the prior
examination of the patent, and explains why reconsideration of the
item of information is being requested; and (3) identifies each item of
information that was incorrect in the prior
°4 examination of the patent,
and explains how it is being corrected.
In addition, the USPTO is proposing to require:
* "an identification of each issue of patentability raised by
each item of information" and
* "a separate, detailed explanation for each identified issue of
patentability, in order to determine whether the submitted
items of information are appropriate for supplemental
examination, and to better
analyze the information
10 5
submitted with the request."'
Whatever decisions the USPTO makes regarding the content of
supplemental examination requests and its handling of situations where
it does not have the information it needs to make a "substantial new
question of patentability" determination, the availability of supplemental
examination suggests a number of candor-related issues and
considerations. Some of these questions are considered in the next
section.

104. Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act and To Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 3670 (Jan. 25, 2012).
105. Id. at3670-71.
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Duty of Candor-RelatedQuestions andImplications
1. Will the Availability of Supplemental Examinations Corrupt
the System?

A key question, of course, is whether the very existence of the
supplemental examination opportunity will foster candor violations
during prosecution or subsequent examination. Some patent owners or
their representatives might be tempted to try to maximize claim scope by
intentionally suppressing or misrepresenting material information during
prosecution if they know they can potentially "clean-up" the violation
later during supplemental examination while still preserving viable claim
scope. Even absent enforcement efforts on the part of the patentee, the
unmerited claim scope has the potential to deter market competitors and
their investors, to the public detriment. 106 Information not readily
accessed via search, such as prior art sales and public uses, or which lies
within the exclusive control of the patent owner, such as undisclosed or
misrepresented test results, or information improperly withheld relating
to inventorship, poses the greatest risk in this regard. However, given
that the patent owner can control whether and when litigation begins,
even publicly available information could potentially be subject to
fraudulent misuse. Congress has presumably considered and rejected
these concerns, but time will tell whether some patent owners might seek
to exploit this opportunity.
2. How will the USPTO Handle Supplemental Examination
Requests that Suggest that Fraud or a Candor Violation
Occurred During a Prior Prosecution?
As noted above, the new supplemental examinations regime has the
potential to permit patent owners to "cure" candor- and fraud-related
enforceability defects in patents. Both the USPTO and practitioners may

106. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing the
Patent-Challenge-Bloc'sAntitrust Status, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 29 (2011) ("even an invalid
patent continued to have an in terrorem effect against other potential defendants: faced with the
choice, 'prospective defendants will often decide that paying royalties under a license or other
settlement is preferable to the costly burden of challenging the patent,' notwithstanding the other
alleged infringer's success at invalidating the patent." (discussing and quoting Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 338 (1971))); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness,
7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 384 (2001) ("[F]ailing to resolve the validity issue,
where raised, permits potentially invalid claims to 'remain in terrorem of the art' and to serve as a
basis for enabling the patent holder to extract license fees, if not monopoly rents." (quoting Royal
Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, 168 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1948)).
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wish to consider another interesting issue raised by the new law: How
will the USPTO handle supplemental examination requests that suggest
that fraud or a candor violation occurred during a prior prosecution?
Consistent with the design of the legislation, many, if not most
requests for supplemental examination would presumably not implicate
the patent owner or its prosecution counsel in any wrongdoing. The
legislative text requires no disclosure beyond the "information believed
to be relevant to the patent."' 107 Thus, although the patent owner will be
required to provide the information and explanations the USPTO
ultimately requires, a request disclosing a previously-undisclosed prior
art reference would, in essence, say to the USPTO: "Here is Reference
X. Please consider whether it raises a substantial new question of
patentability." The USPTO would conduct that evaluation, and either
initiate reexamination or issue its determination that the information
does not substantially implicate patentability. Either way, assuming that
the patent emerges (amended or not) from any resulting reexamination,
the patent owner would have obviated an inequitable conduct challenge
based on the previously-undisclosed reference (subject to the potential
litigation challenges discussed above).
However, there may be situations in which the content of the
request would inherently raise an issue of misconduct on the part of the
patent owner (or its predecessor in interest), or the prosecuting attorney
or agent. For example, the request might disclose unfavorable test data,
and the conditions of the testing 108 strongly suggest that tests in question
must have been done at the same time as the testing that generated the
favorable data the then-applicant relied on to secure the patent in the first
place. Or, suppose that the disclosure of pre-critical date sales activity in
a supplemental examination request makes it clear that the failure to
disclose the activity during original prosecution constituted a candor
violation. Or, what if a supplemental examination request is based on a
previously-uncited, but highly material, rejection in a co-pending
application contemporaneously prosecuted by the same attorney who
prosecuted the patent undergoing supplemental examination? And,
besides situations that imply that misconduct may have occurred, some
requestors might outright (on purpose or by accident) state facts
demonstrating that the applicant or its prosecution counsel knowingly
violated its/his/her disclosure obligations.

107. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 12, § 257(a), 125 Stat. 284, 325 (2011).
108. Assume, for purposes of this hypothetical, that these have to be disclosed in order to make
the data and its potential significance comprehensible.
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As to circumstances reasonably suggesting that "fraud may have
occurred," the statute imposes an obligation on the USPTO to refer the
matter to the Attorney General. 109 But, nothing in the statute requires
the Office to create a fraud investigation unit.1lt And, given the
USPTO's workload and resource constraints1 it seems unlikely that it
will undertake to investigate suspected fraud. i
But, what if, even absent such investigation, a supplemental
examination request reasonably suggests that a candor violation (even if
not an actual fraud) occurred during prosecution? Would (could) the
USPTO simply ignore the "bad facts"? It is true that the USPTO has
previously determined that it is ill-equipped to investigate whether
claims should be rejected because the applicant had procured or
attempted to procure them via fraud. 112 And further, the supplemental
examination proceeding is apparently designed to make any actual or
alleged past misconduct on the part of the patent owner or its
representative irrelevant to its right to patent protection. 113 But, as
evidenced by the legislation's "carve out" for USPTO-detected "material
fraud," the issue of whether the patent is enforceable is a separate issue
from the obligations of registered practitioners, inventors, and others
who participate substantively in patent prosecution to disclose (and
refrain from misrepresenting) known material information to the
USPTO.
The statute provides (at least on its face) an avenue for
investigating and prosecuting material fraud on the part of any
individual-practitioner, inventor, or other person. But, will (should)
that avenue supplant the existing regime for disciplining practitioners?
The USPTO has a duty of candor on the books, and an Office of
Enrollment and Discipline ("OED") charged with "[ilnvestigat[ing]
grievances alleging unethical conduct by registered patent attorneys and
agents",114 in operation. OED has the authority to investigate and punish
inequitable conduct and other violations of the USPTO Code of

109. 125 Stat. at 326-27.
110. Seeid.
111. In 1988, the USPTO announced that it was disbanding the "fraud squad", i.e., that it
would no longer investigate possible instances of inequitable conduct that came to its attention. See
Harry F. Manbeck Jr., Evolution and Futureof New Rule 56 and the Duty of Candor:The Evolution
and Issue of New Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 136, 138-40 (1992).
112. Seeid.
113. As discussed supranote 81 and accompanying text, deceptive intent is simply not relevant
to a patentee's ability to use supplemental examination.
114. OED Responsibilities, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/oed.jsp (last
visited Feb. 16, 2012).
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Professional Responsibility ("USPTO Code"), 115 including, for example,
the prohibitions in 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.23(b)(4) and 10.23(c)(10) against
"[e]ngag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation" and "[k]nowingly violating or causing to be violated
the requirements of § 1.56 or § 1.555."'116 And registered practitioners
assume the special duty to comply with those rules along with the
privilege of representing inventors and assignees before the USPTO.
Consistent with its mission and authority, could OED legitimately ignore
apparent violations of the USPTO's regulations relating to candor and
professional responsibility disclosed in requests for supplemental
examination?
Critics might argue that such scrutiny is inappropriate because, as
OED asserts, "[t]he disciplinary system is designed to protect the public,
not punish practitioners."'' 7 In the context of the patent system,
however, "the public" includes more than just the patent owners whose
interests registered practitioners are duty-bound to advance. It includes.
the courts, the competitors, and potential competitors of patent owners,
and the investors, employees, consumers for whose benefit the patent
system was established.
Accordingly, the implementation of
supplemental examination
should
prompt consideration of the potential
....
118
adverse impact of under-enforcement of stated disciplinary norms
on
these interests as well as the interests of registered practitioners.

115. See, e.g., Brief for Lawrence S. Pope at 2, 6, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and
Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Nos. 2008-1511, 2008-1512, 2008-1513, 2008-1514, 20081595), reh'g en banc granted, op. vacated by 2010 WL 1655391 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2010),
availableat http://www.patentlyo.comlawrence_20s._20pope s 20motion_20for_20leave20to_20
intervene-i.pdf (arguing for leave to intervene on appeal in part because counsel faces disciplinary
inquiries from OED as a result of a district court determination of inequitable conduct); In re
Kelber, No. 2006-13 (USPTO Dir. Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/Dispatch
OEDServlet?decisionType=&contractNo=&respName=kelber&txtlnput-StartDate=&txtlnput -End
Date=&docTextSearch=&page=60 (follow "FOIA OED Initial Decision" link) (advising
practitioner that OED would take no disciplinary action against him based on a U.S. Intemational
Trade Commission determination of inequitable conduct because the conduct in question occurred
outside the applicable statute of limitations, but taking that inequitable conduct into account as
"[w]eighing against any reduction in sanction" for his violation of 37 C.F.R. §§10.23(b)(4) and
10.23(c)(2)(ii) (2008)).
116. 37 C.F.R. § 10.23 (2008).
117. About OED, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/oed.jsp (last visited
Feb. 16, 2012).
118. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics
ofSelf-Defeat and a Callfor a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and PracticalApproach of the Canons,
83 N.C. L. REv. 411, 424 (2005) (collecting authorities discussing the fallout from disciplinary
under-enforcement and decrying the "boundary-seeking" approach of modem disciplinary regimes
("Lawyers are trained not only to determine the boundaries of the law but also to consider the worstcase scenario of violating any given law, i.e. the odds of being caught and the likely punishment.
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Of course, to the extent that supplemental examination requests
reveal or imply past misconduct, it may be difficult to determine whose
misconduct it was. While inventors are subject to the Rule 56 disclosure
duty, 19 and other representatives of the patent owner may be so subject
under particular circumstances, 12 0 they are not bound by the USPTO
Code and are not subject to OED discipline. And although the USPTO
has the power to sanction non-practitioners for violations of 37 C.F.R. §
10.18-its version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11-it appears
that rule would not apply to the kind of misconduct that may be
suggested or revealed in many, at least, supplemental examination
requests. Thus, in cases where non-practitioners were responsible for
knowingly withholding or misrepresenting information, the AIA appears
to contemplate that an Attorney General referral is the potential remedy.
But, as long as there is a USPTO duty of candor, a professional
responsibility code, and a body charged with disciplinary enforcement,
practitioners should (and do, at least theoretically) stand on a different
footing from their clients.
Ironically, the AIA also reflects the drafters' recognition of the
value of upholding the standards that govern practitioner conduct. As
noted above, the ALA expressly preserves the USPTO's power to
regulate the .conduct ....
of those who practice before
121 the Office and to
And, it altered the
investigate and impose sanctions for misconduct.
prior law restricting OED from suspending or excluding practitioners if
the conduct in question occurred more than five years before OED
initiates disciplinary proceedings. 122 In particular, the AIA amended 35
U.S.C. § 32-the statute that authorizes the USPTO to suspend or
exclude registered practitioners, including for misconduct-to recite:
A proceeding under this section shall be commenced not later than the
earlier of either the date that is 10 years after the date on which the
misconduct forming the basis for the proceeding occurred, or 1 year
after the date on which the misconduct forming the basis for the

Here the drafters' choice to emphasize the boundary-seeking heuristic is particularly devastating
because the minimum Rules governing lawyers are, in fact, notoriously under-enforced.")).
119. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c)(1) (2000).
120. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c)(3) (2000) (imposing the duty to disclose information material to
patentability on "[e]very other person substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the
application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there
is an obligation to assign the application.").
121. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 12, § 257(), 125 Stat. 284, 327 (2011).
122. See Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
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proceeding is made known to an officer or employee of the Office
123

Thus although the USPTO now has only one year to initiate a
disciplinary proceeding after "the misconduct... is made known to [a
USPTO] officer or employee," subject to that limitation it can act as 1 to
24
conduct that occurred up to ten years before the proceeding occurred.
In this sense, the limitations period has been extended, a change which
appears to reflect a congressional determination that the prior, shorter
"look-back" period was inadequate. That the legislative enactment
creating a new system for securing USPTO consideration of information
that might otherwise ground an inequitable conduct allegation includes a
provision that extends the disciplinary look-back period indicates the
drafters' intent to hold practitioners accountable for candor violations
and militates in favor of USPTO-OED scrutiny of supplemental
examination requests.
The bottom line is that the USPTO has imposed on practitioners
and applicants a duty of candor, including an affirmative duty to disclose
information material to patentability. 125 Although some have called for
its abolition, 126 the USPTO evidently believes that the disclosure duty
serves to promote the advancement of its objectives. It defended its
broad disclosure standard in the Therasense litigation, 127 and has
proposed in the wake of that litigation to retain, but align its disclosure
duty requirements with the materiality standard announced in
Therasense.128 Furthermore, in its post-Therasense notice of proposed
rulemaking, the USPTO contemplates and even 2 9encourages the
submission of more information than the rule requires. 1

123. 125 Stat. at291.
124. Id.
125. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(2000).
126. See, e.g., Erstling, supra note 11. See also Eli Lilly & Company's (Lilly) Comments to
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Office) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking entitled:
Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty To Disclose Information in Patent
Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43631, 43634 (July 21, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2011-07-21/pdf/2011-1 8408.pdf.
127. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither
Party at 8-18, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos.
2008-1511, 2008-1512, 2008-1513, 2008-1514 & 2008-1595), 2011 WL 4734329.
128. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for
the Duty To Disclose Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43631, 43634 (July 21,
2011).
129. Id. at 43633.
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The Federal Circuit has now revised but retained the inequitable
conduct defense. 130 In the AIA, Congress expressly reaffirmed the
authority of the USPTO to regulate practitioner conduct,131 extended the
look-back period for investigating practitioner misconduct, 132 and
included in the provisions relating to supplemental examination a
requirement for referral of suspected "material fraud" to the Attorney
General. 133 And the USPTO has encouraged applicants to continue to
broadly construe their disclosure obligations even as it has proposed to
conform its disclosure rule with the Federal Circuit's inequitable
conduct law. 134 Accordingly, there appears to be a commitment to
retaining and enforcing the duty of disclosure on the part of the Court,
the Congress, and the USPTO. Whether and how that commitment will
manifest under Therasense and the AIA remains to be seen.
3. How will Supplemental Examination Affect the PractitionerClient Relationship?
Although much about how practitioners might be affected by
supplemental examination proceedings is uncertain, their introduction
may prompt new thinking about the practitioner-client relationship on
the part of both patent owners and practitioners.
As noted above, 135 inherent in the design of supplemental
examinations is the opportunity for the patent owner to liberate the
property right from any taint resulting from misconduct in its
procurement. 136 It is this dissociation in particular that has the potential
to impact the client-practitioner relationship.
From the perspective of the patent owner, supplemental
examination provides an opportunity to have the USPTO consider,
reconsider, or correct information relating to patentability, and to
remove that information as a potential basis for a viable inequitable
conduct challenge in the courts. In some cases, at least, it can be
expected that the patent owner's primary or even sole consideration,
then, will be the "cleansing" of the patent.

130. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1282-96.
131. See supranote 54 and accompanying text.
132. See supranotes 123-24 and accompanying text.
133. See supranotes 49-50 and accompanying text.
134. See supranotes 128-30 and accompanying text.
135. See supranote 90 and accompanying text.
136. Notably, this opportunity is available even if the misconduct was committed by the patent
owner himself or herself, or by a person (such as the inventor or an in-house attorney) employed
directly by the patent owner.
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However, as noted above, the very legislation that creates this
opportunity for patent owners requires the USPTO to refer suspected
material fraud to the Attorney General. 137 And, as is expressly
preserved by the AIA, the USPTO retains its authority to discipline
registered practitioners. 13
Thus, where misconduct such as an
intentional candor violation did occur or might reasonably be suspected
to have occurred, supplemental examination might lead to disciplinaryor even more serious-investigations and consequences for practitioners.
Accordingly, the interests of patent owners and the practitioners who
assisted in the procurement (or a prior examination) of the patent, as
they relate to the use of supplemental examination, have the potential to
diverge-significantly.
For those patent owners who are themselves not potentially subject
to criminal or disciplinary investigation or sanction, this possibility
should not present a problem. Patent owners are free, of course, to hire
different counsel for supplemental examination than they used to
prosecute the patent in the first place. And, given that deceptive intent is
irrelevant to supplemental examination and that any consequences for
misconduct unearthed in supplemental examination will affect only the
person(s) suspected of being involved in that misconduct, a patent owner
(it appears) need not be concerned about whether a supplemental
examination request suggests such misconduct. But, practitioners may
find such a situation disconcerting, as they may have concerns about
being thrown under the proverbial bus, even where the patent owner did
not so intend.
For one thing, by definition, a practitioner who is not engaged to
participate in the preparation of a supplemental examination request that
relates to a prior prosecution in which she was engaged will not have the
opportunity to participate in the development of such a request.
However, a practitioner who is engaged to file a supplemental
examination request pertaining to an earlier prosecution in which he was
involved may face an additional or different concern, namely, whether
the circumstances create a conflict between his client's interest in
cleansing the patent and his personal interest in his reputation and good
standing.
Much in this regard will depend on whether supplemental
examinations ultimately lead to any conduct-related investigations or
charges.
In the meantime, the potential effects of supplemental

137. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 12, § 257, 125 Stat. 284, 325-27 (2011).
138. Id.
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examination relating to the relationship between clients and practitioners
are among the questions raised by this proceeding.
4. The Predicate Question: Will Patent Owners Utilize
Supplemental Examination?
Ultimately, of course, the significance and impact of supplemental
examination will depend on whether (and how) it is used by patentees.
Ironically, its potential significance has been undercut even before it is
available. By altering the materiality standard, Therasense facilitates the
use of other post-grant options in some circumstances for patent owners
concerned about potential future inequitable conduct allegations.
In particular,
the materiality required to establish inequitable conduct is [now] butfor materiality. When an applicant fails to disclose prior art to the
[USPTO], that prior art is but-for material if the [USPTO] would not
have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art.
Hence, in assessing the materiality of a withheld reference, the court
must determine whether the [USPTO] would have allowed the claim if
it had been aware of the undisclosed reference. In making this
patentability determination, the court should apply the preponderance
of the evidence standard and give claims their broadest reasonable
construction.. 139
Thus, the inequitable conduct materiality standard now entails the same
inquiry, in essence, as the patentability evaluation undertaken in
reexamination and reissue. Accordingly, where a patent owner procures
a patentability confirmation via reexamination or reissue, it has
effectively secured evidence that the USPTO has determined that the
information it considered in reexamination or reissue was not but-for
material. Such a determination would not bind a court. However, it
would, presumably, have evidentiary significance, as the confirmation of
claims over the information that the USPTO considered in
reexamination or reissue is inconsistent with the notion that the
information was but-for material. Thus, although inequitable conduct
could not previously be "cured" via reexamination or reissue,
Therasense appears to have significantly enhanced the potential tactical

139.

Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291-92.
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utility, in some circumstances, of such proceedinps for patent owners
who anticipate or face inequitable conduct charges.
Furthermore, of course, even without taking advantage of
reexamination or reissue, patent owners now enjoy the heightened
protection of the but-for materiality standard in inequitable conduct
litigation. As a result, in some cases, patent owners will not find it
necessary to seek a USPTO determination in a post-issuance proceeding.
The but-for standard facilitates dealing directly with inequitable conduct
allegations in the courts.
On the other hand, by going back to the USPTO (in an appropriate
case), the patent owner can take advantage of the ex parte nature of
reexamination, reissue, or supplemental examination.
And, only
supplemental examination can provide a patent owner with a statutory
immunity from an inequitable conduct determination. 14 1 However,
some patent owners may eschew supplemental examination to avoid
opening up existing claims to reevaluation for compliance with other
patentability requirements, 142 or out of concern that supplemental
examination requests might draw enhanced USPTO or litigation
43
scrutiny. 1

140. See, e.g., Scott McKeown, The Impact of Therasense on Patent Reform, Patents PostGrant (July 19, 2011), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2011/07/the-impact-of-therasenseon-patent-reform (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
141. See supranotes 75-76 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., McKeown, supra note 140.
143. Other questions relating to the supplemental examination and the duty of candor concern
the potential for follow-on litigation. For example, to what extent will litigation ensue in
enforcement actions filed following the completion of supplemental examinations on the issue of
what information was disclosed in the request and is therefore "off the table" for judicial
consideration? In some cases, no doubt, infringement defendants will try to recast the information
disclosed by the patent owner, or argue that the patent owner's disclosure was inaccurate,
inadequate, or misleading, in order to get out from under the statutory preemption and have the
opportunity to litigate inequitable conduct. In some, the patent owner might over-read what it
disclosed to the USPTO in an attempt to extend the scope of the statutory preemption beyond that to
which it is entitled. Given the contentious, high-stakes nature of patent litigation, it seems likely
that litigation opponents will battle over the quality and scope of the patent owner's disclosure in
supplemental examination.
Such battles might take the form, in some cases, of disputes over whether the patent
owner violated its duty of candor during the supplemental examination proceeding. Under the
terms of the legislation, a patent owner could presumably file subsidiary requests for supplemental
examination to have the USPTO "consider, reconsider, or correct" information that was "not...
considered, was inadequately considered, or was incorrect" in the first or earlier supplemental
examination(s), but only if the patent owner discovers the problem and initiates a supplemental
examination before a potential defendant initiates a declaratory judgment or Paragraph IV challenge
to the enforceability of the patent or initiates a supplemental examination which is concluded before
filing suit. This reality provides a powerful incentive to infringement defendants sued following
supplemental examination to argue in that litigation that the patent owner's disclosure was
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IV. CONCLUSION

Supplemental examination is the AIA's solution to the inequitable
conduct problem-the legislative cure for "the plague." Creative patent
owners and challengers can be expected to carefully consider the
strategic opportunities and challenges it offers. And, the USPTO and the
courts will consider and adjudicate the consequences and significance of
the choices and arguments that parties make regarding its use.
Congress was not writing on a blank slate, however. The insertion
of this new procedure into the patent system, which is
contemporaneously undergoing other significant AIA-related change,
introduces issues beyond those which would otherwise arise from
implementing a new procedure. One set of such issues relates to the
relationship between the patent applicant's duty of candor and the new
supplemental examination, which can be used to "cleanse" a patent
procured via an intentional breach of that duty. As discussed in this
paper, the candor-related questions that lie at this intersection have the
potential to affecting applicants, patent owners, their counsel, as well as
the USPTO and the public, in new and unanticipated ways.

intentionally inadequate or misleading-in effect, that the patent owner committed inequitable
conduct in supplemental examination-to attempt to cut off (under an interpretation of new section
257(c)(2)(A) that includes defenses pled in patent enforcement actions) the patentee's ability to
remedy the new alleged under- or mis-disclosure in a subsequent supplemental examination.
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